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According to ideomotor theories, intended effects caused by a certain action are antici-
pated before action execution. In the present study, we examined the question of whether
action effects play a role in cued task-switching. In our study, the participants practiced
task-response-effect mappings in an acquisition phase, in which action effects occur after
a response in a certain task context. In the ensuing transfer phase, the previously prac-
ticed mappings were changed in a random, unpredictable task-response-effect mapping.
When changed into unpredictable action-effects, RT as well as switch-costs increased, but
this occurred mainly in trials with short preparation time and not with long preparation
time. Moreover, switch costs were generally smaller with predictable action-effects than
with unpredictable action-effects.This suggests that anticipated task-specific action effects
help to activate the relevant task-set before task execution when the task is not yet already
prepared based on the cue.
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INTRODUCTION
The question of how human actions are mentally controlled is one
that has been investigated since the early beginnings of cognitive
psychological research in the nineteenth century (for a historical
review see Stock and Stock, 2004; Shin et al., 2010, for a more
recent review). According to the ideomotor principle, actions are
controlled by internal processes – the anticipation of the intended
action-effect (James, 1890). That is, the intended result of the
action is already mentally represented before the action execution
and controls the action.
A challenge for action control is to select and execute the
appropriate action among a variety of feasible actions in a cer-
tain situation and to ignore or inhibit possibly competing actions.
This implies that the system of action-selection processes has also
to be very flexible. The context in which an action is performed
is highly important (Brass et al., 2003; Kunde et al., 2007; Braver-
man and Meiran, 2010) and can change easily. This context and
all other important components that are necessary to perform an
action (or a task) are assumed to be mentally represented in a task
set (see, e.g., Prinz et al., 2009). A task set contains information
for example about the appropriate class of task-relevant stimuli,
the stimulus-dimension, and the response mode (e.g., Philipp and
Koch, 2010). The nature of a task set and its flexibility has been
investigated in a variety of studies using the task-switching para-
digm (see, e.g., Monsell, 2003; Kiesel et al., 2010; Koch et al., 2010;
Meiran, 2010, for reviews).
In a typical task-switching experiment, subjects are instructed
to switch between two reaction tasks that appear in a random
order. It is usually found that performance [reaction time (RT)
and error rate] is worse after a task switch than after a task rep-
etition. These switch costs are supposed to reflect, at least partly,
“executive” processes that are needed for switching between tasks.
These executive processes imply on the one hand the maintenance
of a mental representation of the current task. On the other hand,
flexibility is required and the ability to inhibit the just executed
task set. This includes the ability to overcome the persisting task
activation (which is called task-set inertia), to shift attention to the
new, currently relevant task-set, and to activate the new task-set
(e.g., Allport et al., 1994; Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 1996;
Kiesel et al., 2010).
Action effects, that is, effects that happen as a consequence
of the specific task execution, might help to reduce the conflict
of ambiguous task-sets. When referring to action effects, we are
referring to effects or events that take place after the response, as
explicit consequence of the response. Examples for action effects
are the tone that is heard after pressing a piano’s keyboard or the
light that is turned on after pressing the light switch.
The influence of action effects that occur after response execu-
tion can be realized by the anticipation of the effect, which happens
temporally before response execution, as assumed in the ideo-
motor principle. For example, when playing a piano, the pianist
anticipates already the tone he/she wants to produce before press-
ing the key (see for empirical evidence e.g., Keller and Koch, 2008).
That this kind of anticipation not only takes place in humans
but also in animals was shown in so-called “differential outcome”
studies (for a review, see Urcuioli, 2005). In these studies, animals
learn different responses to different stimuli that lead to different
outcomes. It is assumed that in learning of stimulus-response-
outcome contingencies, the outcomes (or action effects in our
terminology) are part of what is learned and are not merely “rein-
forcers.” That is, they serve as anticipatory cue to guide behavior
by adding up to discrimination of the possible action alternatives
(see Urcuioli, 2005).
When we assume that action effects influence response selec-
tion, action effects might also play a crucial role in task-switching.
However, as far as we know, the impact of action effects have
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been neglected in task-switching research, even though in the
literature, the concept of task-set appears often in conjunction
with action control (e.g., Kunde et al., 2007; Hommel, 2009;
Prinz et al., 2009). However, only few studies indeed combined
a task-switching paradigm with effects that took place after the
response.
Kiesel and Hoffmann (2004) reported one of the few stud-
ies that added action effects to a task-switching paradigm. They
used this paradigm to create two different contexts (horizontal
vs. vertical arrangement of a target) in which the same action
(a key stroke) was performed, leading to two different action-
effects (short/fast vs. long/slow movements of the target in the
horizontal and vertical arrangement, respectively). Reactions were
slower in the slow-movement context and faster in the fast-
movement context, although these target movements occurred
after the response. Hence, it was shown that action-effect asso-
ciations are acquired according to the context and that the basi-
cally same actions are influenced by different (context-dependent)
effect anticipation.
In another study, Ruge et al. (2010) provided task-related action
effects in one condition and task-unspecific feedback about the
correct execution of the task in another condition. Two target
stimuli were horizontally and vertically aligned. A cue indicated
if the position of the horizontal or the vertical target should be
determined. The task-related action effect was a red light-up of the
target in the position which indicated the correct response. This
means, if the correct response was “right,” the target on the right
side appeared red as consequence of the response, whereas the ver-
tical target stayed colorless; and if the correct response was“up,”the
target turned red on the up-position, whereas the horizontal target
stayed colorless. The action effects were thus semantically associ-
ated with the correct response. The task-unspecific effect was just a
feedback with the information whether the task was executed cor-
rectly or not. The authors found a significant two-way interaction
of task transition and type of effect for trials with a long cue-target
interval (CTI; i.e., 1500 ms). In the task-specific effect condition,
residual switch costs were reduced compared to the unspecific
effect condition. That is, anticipating task-specific action effects
might help to discriminate the task sets of the upcoming trial and
select the appropriate one. However, in this study, only trials with
a long CTI were analyzed so that no statement can be made about
how action effects influence task performance in trials with a short
CTI.
Moreover, the question of whether the anticipation of action
effects indeed influences the task activation process was not in the
focus of these studies. According to ideomotor theories, action
effects are mentally represented before response execution (e.g.,
James, 1890; Greenwald, 1970). That is, if action effects are men-
tally represented before response execution, the representation of
action effects should influence the activation of a task set, for
example by helping to discriminate the task sets.
The aim of the present study was to examine the role of
action effects in task-switching. To this end, we devised a novel
transfer paradigm. In order that intended effects can trigger
actions, the regularities between the action and the following
effect have to be acquired, so that stable action-effect associa-
tions result in effect anticipation prior to action execution (e.g.,
Elsner and Hommel, 2001, 2004; Dutzi and Hommel, 2009; cf.
also Zießler et al., 2004). For this reason, we divided our experi-
mental paradigm in two phases. In the first phase, the participants
had to learn the task-response-effect contingencies so that task-
response-effect associations could be established. These effects can
then be anticipated after the cue is presented. In the second, trans-
fer phase, the previously practiced mappings were changed into a
random mapping, so that valid anticipation of action effects was
no longer possible.
We assumed that in the acquisition phase the expected action-
effects are anticipated after the presentation of the cue before task
execution, probably during action planning (see Zießler et al.,
2004), thus helping to further disambiguate the task set relative
to the currently irrelevant, competing task set. We would like to
note here that with the cue, both possible action-effects for the
appropriate task (i.e., that occurring after the left or right response
key-press) are anticipated. If the previously experienced task-
response-effect mappings, however, are not valid anymore, as in
the transfer phase, the implementation of the task-set should take
more time because the effects as additional cues for task-set dis-
ambiguation cannot be utilized any longer prior to task activation.
This prolongation, if observed, might be due to additional mon-
itoring processes that “double-check” if the implemented task-set
is appropriate.
If the influence of anticipated action-effects needs time to build
up, we would assume an influence of task preparation time. To
examine the influence of preparation time on the impact of action
effects in task-switching, we manipulated the cue-target interval. If
the task-response-effect association becomes stronger with more
time to activate the task set, then we would expect a more pro-
nounced increase in RT and switch costs for long preparation
intervals compared to short preparation intervals. However, with
the presentation of the cue, the cue-task association is as well
retrieved, entailing a sustained bias to the relevant task compo-
nents (Meiran, 2000; Koch and Allport, 2006; Meiran et al., 2008),
so that the influence of anticipated action-effects becomes smaller
when the task is already well prepared based on the cue. Given
that the action effects are nominally task-irrelevant (and occur
only after task execution), we assume that they play a stronger role
primarily when the task is not yet fully prepared (i.e., with short
CTI).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-four students of the RWTH Aachen university (19 female,
5 male; mean age= 23 years) took part in the experiment. They
received partial course credit or 8C. The participants were equally
and randomly assigned to the experimental vs. the control group.
Informed consent was obtained from all subjects, and the exper-
iment was performed according to the ethical standards of the
Declaration of Helsinki.
APPARATUS, STIMULI, AND TASKS
The experiment was programmed with the experimental run-
time system ERTS (Version 3.33e, BeriSoft Cooperation, Frankfurt
am Main, Germany). Participants sat in front of a screen with a
viewing distance of approximately 60 cm. The stimuli consisted of
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digits ranging from one till nine, without the five. They appeared
in white on a black background at the center of the screen with a
height of 1.4 cm (vertical visual angle: 1.34˚).
The two tasks were two numerical judgment tasks. In one task,
the participants had to decide if a presented number was greater or
less than five (i.e., the magnitude task). In the other task, the par-
ticipants had to decide if the presented number was odd or even
(i.e., the parity task). The tasks switched randomly and were indi-
cated by a cue. Each number was framed by either a diamond or a
rectangle. If the number was framed by a diamond, the magnitude
task was required; if the number was framed by a rectangle, the
parity task was required. The diamond was 3 cm high and 3 cm
wide (vertical and horizontal visual angle: 2.86˚). The rectangle
was 3.6 cm high and 3.5 cm wide (vertical visual angle: 3.44˚; hori-
zontal visual angle: 3.34˚). Responses were to be made by manually
pressing one of two response keys (i.e., the left and right Alt-key)
with the left or right index finger. Participants were instructed to
press left for a smaller or an odd number and to press right for
a greater or an even number. If the response given by the par-
ticipants was correct, an action-effect occurred. The effects were
assigned to the task and the response in the experimental group
in the first eight “acquisition blocks.” For example, for the mag-
nitude task, visual action-effects and for the parity task, auditory
action-effects occurred. If the response was “less” (left key-press),
the background of the screen turned yellow and if the response was
“greater” (right key-press), the background of the screen turned
green. For the parity task, a honking tone was presented after the
correct response for “odd” (left key-press) and a ringing tone after
the correct response for “even” was presented (right key-press).
The mapping between task, response, and action-effect was coun-
terbalanced across participants in the experimental group. For
the control group, the action effects were completely random,
that is, participants could not establish an association between
task, response, and action-effect and thus could not anticipate the
action effect. If the response was wrong, nothing happened, the
background just turned black in both groups. Participants were
instructed to react as fast and as correct as possible. They were
informed in both groups that the effects happening after the key-
press should be used as feedback whether the task was performed
correctly.
PROCEDURE
Each trial started with a cue, which appeared in half of the tri-
als 100 ms prior to the target stimulus (CTI of 100 ms) and in the
other half of the trials 900 ms prior to the target stimulus. The CTI
duration varied randomly. Cues and stimuli stayed on the screen
until a response was given. For both CTI levels, an action effect was
presented for 200 ms immediately after a correct response. That is,
the response-cue interval (RCI) was held constant at 400 ms and
the response-stimulus interval (RSI) was 500 ms for trials with a
short CTI and 1300 ms for trials with a long CTI.
Before the experiment started, the participants performed a
practice block with 16 trials. The experiment consisted of eight
acquisition blocks and one transfer block. The acquisition blocks
as well as the transfer block comprised 96 trials each plus four
warm-up trials that were not recorded. Altogether, one session
lasted about 45 min.
In the experimental group, the task-response-effect associa-
tions were predictable so that a mental task-response-effect asso-
ciation could be established by the participants. In the transfer
block, the learned associations were changed into random action-
effects as in the control group. There was no difference between the
acquisition blocks and the transfer block in the control group. To
analyze the influence of the change in the action-effect assignment,
performance in the last acquisition block (Block 8) was compared
with that in the transfer block (Block 9).
DESIGN
Task transition (switch vs. repetition), block (Block 8 vs. Block
9), and CTI (short vs. long) were used as independent within-
participants variables; group (experimental vs. control) was used
as independent between-participants variable. RT and error rate
were measured as dependent variables. Significance was tested at
α= 0.05.
RESULTS
In addition to the four non-registered warm-up trials, the first
recorded trial of each block was excluded from analysis because
it could not be categorized as a switch or repetition trial. All
trials with RT less than 200 ms or exceeding 3 SD of each partici-
pant’s mean were discarded as RT outliers (i.e., 2%). Furthermore,
all incorrect trials and that following an incorrect trial were not
included in the analysis. Errors occurred in 4.8% of the trials.
RT
The data were submitted to a four-way mixed analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) with the independent variables task transition,
block, CTI, and group. To forestall the most important result:
the four-way interaction of task transition, block, CTI, and group
was significant, F(1, 22)= 5.49, p= 0.029,η2= 0.2 (see Figure 1).
That is, the increase of switch costs in the transfer block with
a short preparation interval takes place only for the experimen-
tal group, whereas there were no effects of block in the control
group. To better understand this four-way interaction, below we
split the analysis in the two experimental groups and analyzed
them separately with two three-way ANOVAs. In the overall, four-
way ANOVA, the main effect of group was not significant, F = 1.2.
The only other interaction with the variable group was the two-
way interaction of group and block, F(1, 22)= 4.98, p= 0.036,
η2= 0.185. Only in the experimental group, RT increased in Block
9 (from 817 to 882 ms), but not in the control group (776 vs.
775 ms). This interaction is also reflected in the split ANOVA, as
described below.
For the experimental group, the three-way interaction of task
transition, block, and CTI was significant, F(1, 11)= 12.34,
p= 0.005, η2= 0.529. Switch-costs increased significantly from
Block 8 (75 ms) to Block 9 (226 ms) in short CTI trials, whereas
they even somewhat decreased numerically from Block 8 (61 ms)
to Block 9 (49 ms) in long CTI trials. Further, the two-way inter-
action of task transition and CTI was significant, F(1, 11)= 6.7,
p= 0.025, η2= 0.378, showing that switch-costs decreased from
150 ms for short CTIs to 56 ms for long CTIs. The main effects
of task transition, F(1, 11)= 30.03, p< 0.001, η2= 0.732, block,
F(1, 11)= 10.3, p= 0.008, η2= 0.484, and CTI, F(1, 11)= 11.05,
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FIGURE 1 | Mean reaction times (RT) in ms as a function of task transition, experimental phase, group, and cue-target interval (CTI).
p= 0.007,η2= 0.501 were significant, too. RT was shorter for rep-
etition trials (798 ms) than for switch trials (901 ms), for Block 8
(817 ms) than for Block 9 (882 ms) and for long CTIs (807 ms)
than for short CTIs (893 ms). To go more into detail, and under-
stand better the three-way interaction, we further split the analysis
in two two-way ANOVAs for short and long CTI trials.
The trials with a short CTI showed a significant two-way inter-
action of task transition and block, F(1, 11)= 6.75, p= 0.025,
η2= 0.380, indicating that switch-costs increased in the transfer
block. Further, the main effect of task transition was signifi-
cant, F(1, 11)= 35.38, p< 0.001, η2= 0.763 whereas the main
effect of block was just not significant, F(1, 11)= 4.13, p= 0.067,
η2= 0.273. For the trials with a long CTI, the two-way interaction
of task transition and block was not significant, F < 1. The main
effect of task transition failed to reach significance, F(1, 11)= 4.07,
p= 0.069, η2= 0.270, but the main effect of block was significant,
F(1, 11)= 11.26, p= 0.006, η2= 0.506. RT was increased from
Block 8 (770 ms) to Block 9 (843 ms).
In contrast to the experimental group, in the control group, the
three-way interaction of task transition, block, and CTI was not
significant, F < 1. The well-known two-way interaction of task
transition and CTI was significant, F(1, 11)= 11.03, p= 0.007,
η2= 0.501. It reflects a reduction of switch costs with a long prepa-
ration interval (short CTI: 179 ms, long CTI: 95 ms). The main
effects of task transition, F(1, 11)= 20.74, p= 0.001, η2= 0.653,
and CTI, F (1, 11)= 47.69, p< 0.001, η2= 0.813 were significant.
RTs were faster in repetition trials (707 ms) than in switch trials
(844 ms) and faster with a long preparation interval (709 ms) than
with a short preparation interval (841 ms). There was neither a
main effect of block, nor an interaction including this variable
(Fs< 1).
In the analysis of trials with a long preparation interval in the
experimental group, we found small and non-significant switch-
costs, like in the study of Ruge et al. (2010). Hence, we further
investigated if we could also find diminished residual switch-
costs with predictable action-effects compared to unpredictable
action-effects already in the acquisition phase. In order to do
this, we analyzed RTs averaged across the first eight acquisition
blocks (see Table 1). These data were submitted to a three-way
ANOVA with a 2 (task transition)× 2 (CTI)× 2 (group) design.
Noteworthy, the interaction of transition and group was signif-
icant, F(1, 22)= 20.02, p< 0.001, η2= 0.476. Switch costs were
higher in the control group (190 ms) than in the experimental
group (50 ms). Also, the three-way interaction of transition, CTI,
and group was significant, F(1, 22)= 4.51, p= 0.045, η2= 0.17.
Switch costs were especially high in the control group in short CTI
trials (250 ms), but could be reduced with a long CTI (130 m),
which is a reduction of 48%. However, in the experimental group,
switch costs were even more reduced with a long CTI (from 75
to 24 ms), which is a reduction of 68%. In addition, also the
expected interaction of transition and CTI was significant, F(1,
22)= 28.29, p< 0.001, η2= 0.563. Switch costs were higher in
trials with a short CTI (162 ms) than with in trials with a long
CTI (77 ms). As expected, the main effect of transition, F(1,
22)= 58.41, p< 0.001, η2= 0.726, and of CTI were significant,
too, F(1, 22)= 105.26, p< 0.001, η2= 0.827. Neither the main
effect of group was significant, F = 1.3, nor the interaction of CTI
and group, F = 2.29.
To check at which point of time the switch-costs decreased for
the experimental group, we additionally took a look at the switch
costs in the first eight blocks for the experimental and the con-
trol group. The main effect of group was not significant, F = 1.2.
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Table 1 | Mean RT in ms (and SE) of the first eight blocks (acquisition
phase) as a function of task transition (repetition vs. switch), CTI
(short vs. long), and group (Experimental group vs. Control group).
Cue-target interval
Task transition Short Long
Group Experimental group Switch 989 (60) 855 (56)
Repetition 913 (43) 831 (41)
Control group Switch 1017 (60) 811 (56)
Repetition 767 (43) 681 (41)
Already in the first two blocks, the switch costs were smaller in the
experimental group (Block 1: 81 ms; Block 2: 47 ms) than in the
control group (Block 1: 267 ms; Block 2: 280 ms). The interaction
of transition and group in the first two blocks was accordingly
significant, F(1, 22)= 20.02, p< 0.001, η2= 0.476.
ERRORS
For the error rate, the four-way ANOVA for Block 8 and 9 was con-
ducted. It revealed only a main effect of task transition with fewer
errors in repetition trials than in switch trials (3.9 vs. 5.97%),
F(1, 22)= 7.86, p= 0.01, η2= 0.263. No other main effect or
interaction was significant, Fs< 1.9.
Also in the first eight blocks, no difference between group was
shown, F < 1, nor an interaction with switch costs.
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to investigate the role of action
effects in task-switching. In order to examine this question, we
designed a task-switching paradigm in which task-irrelevant, but
predictable action-effects occurred. The task-response-effect map-
pings were practiced in eight acquisition blocks, so that action
effects could be reliably anticipated. In a ninth (transfer) block, the
action effects were random, so that the effects could no longer be
anticipated in a task- and response-specific way. Additionally, the
CTI was manipulated to examine effects of task preparation. The
results showed that going from predictable (i.e., anticipated) to
unpredictable action-effects increased both RT and switch costs.
However, this influence of anticipated action-effects was found
only in trials with a short CTI.
The fact that task-switching performance is impaired when
previously learned action-effects cannot be anticipated anymore
in a task-specific way relative to when action effects are unpre-
dictable throughout the experiment shows that the predictable
effects have been anticipated because otherwise an influence of
stimuli that occur after response execution would be quite inex-
plicable. Hence, this influence of action effects is consistent with
the already existing literature on effect anticipation (e.g., Elsner
and Hommel, 2001; Koch and Kunde, 2002; Kunde et al., 2007).
Moreover, the finding that the influence of action effects depends
on both CTI and task transition (i.e., is largest on switch tri-
als with short CTI) rules out a general “surprise” effect because
this should be comparable across conditions. Note that even the
concept of surprise presupposes that an expectation, that is, antic-
ipation is violated, so that surprise actually assumes anticipation.
However, we assume that the role of anticipated action-effects
is more specific and lingering, because it cannot be ignored
easily. A mere surprise effect should be transient and easier to
overcome.
To account for the data, we assume that in short CTI trials,
the task set of the previous task is still activated, so that a new
implementation is not necessary in task repetition trials. But for
switch trials, a new task-set has to be activated, which is a time-
consuming process. In implementing the relevant task-set, also the
task-response-effect associations are activated, which helps in fur-
ther disambiguating the task set so that less interference between
competing task-sets occurs. That is, for the magnitude task, the
two visual action-effects and for the parity task, the two audi-
tory effects are anticipated. The anticipation helps to activate and
implement the correct task-set, reducing the switch costs. How-
ever, if the action effects are not predictable anymore, they cannot
facilitate selection of task or response any longer, yielding higher
RT in switch trials. In contrast, in trials with long CTIs, partici-
pants have enough time to activate the relevant task-set based on
the cue, so that the switch-specific component of the facilitative
influence of anticipated action-effects disappears. However, antic-
ipated action-effects still show a general beneficial influence in task
switches and repetitions alike, probably because the task-specific
action-effect anticipation in the response selection process helps
keeping the task sets better separate and thus counters stimulus-
based task interference (e.g., Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Koch and
Allport, 2006). Note that the idea that not the stimuli themselves
are made more distinguishable from each other, but the task con-
text or the required action is also endorsed by studies examining
the differential outcome effect in animals (e.g., Honig et al., 1984;
cf. also Urcuioli, 2005).
In explaining our data, we would like to point out again that the
action effects are completely irrelevant to the task. Keep in mind
that the predictable action-effects occur after the response and
could therefore easily have been ignored. Nevertheless, they influ-
enced task-switching performance, and specifically switch-costs,
when the preparation time was short. The increased switch-costs
as well as the increased RTs for long CTIs are an indication that
the action effects could not be ignored, and thus affected task
performance.
Action-selection can be externally controlled by stimuli or
internally by goals and/or intentions. In earlier studies, it was
shown that learning of task-effect associations only took place
in an intention based experimental setting (Herwig et al., 2007;
Herwig and Waszak, 2009). Thus, it is noteworthy that in our
study, task-effect associations were built up even though learn-
ing was rather stimulus-based on the cue than intention based.
However, Herwig and Waszak (2009) also stated that under cer-
tain experimental conditions, like more complex S–R mappings,
action effects might become more important, thus allowing also
“ideomotor” learning for stimulus-based actions. Moreover, it
was recently shown that also stimulus-based settings can yield
response-effect expectancies (Pfister et al., 2010) or effect-response
preferences after a forced-choice acquisition phase (Pfister et al.,
2011). Our study provides additional evidence that under forced-
choice, stimulus-based action-effect learning takes place and
influences the response behavior.
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One would assume that the action-effect associations built up
in the acquisition phase is weakened in the transfer phase. Con-
sequently, the increase in switch costs should be higher in the
beginning of the transfer block than at a later point of time.
However, there is an alternative explanation: one could argue that
participants realize that the action effects are not useful anymore
to add up to activate a task set and adopt a task-processing strat-
egy like in the control condition. As we have seen, switch costs
are higher in the control group than in the experimental group.
Consequently, an increase of switch costs at a later point of time
in the transfer block should be assumed. We checked which of the
two explanations holds by comparing the switch costs in the first
half of the transfer block to the switch costs in the second half of
the block for each group. However, we could not find an interac-
tion of task transition, block half, and group. Switch costs changed
neither in the control group nor in the experimental group sig-
nificantly from the first to the second half of the last block. As
already mentioned before, this finding speaks additionally against
a mere “surprise effect” as surprise should have only a transient
effect.
Our results also showed a difference in the switch costs between
groups already in the acquisition phase. The experimental group
with the predictable action-effects revealed smaller switch costs
than the control group with the random action-effects, corrobo-
rating the results of the study of Ruge et al. (2010). However, the
switch costs were mainly reduced because the repetition trials in
the experimental group showed higher RT than the repetition tri-
als in the control group. The RT in the control group and the
resulting switch costs of about 190 ms are to be expected for
a parity-magnitude task-switching experiment (cf. e.g., Arring-
ton and Logan, 2005). That is, providing action-effects might
lead to an aggravation of performance in repetition trials. It is
possible, that the higher information content with predictable
action-effects leads to longer task-processing time, during which
the action effects are anticipated. But this is only observed in
repetition trials because action-effect anticipation can be done
simultaneously in the additional time in which a task switch is
prepared. As soon as this additional information processing is
done, the anticipated action-effects help to disambiguate differ-
ent task-sets: In the experimental group, switch costs were not
additionally increased in general, but they were proportionally
more strongly reduced by a long preparation interval. In con-
trast to the action effects in the study of Kiesel and Hoffmann
(2004) and Ruge et al. (2010), the action effects in our study were
arbitrary and task-irrelevant. Nevertheless, they can easily be inte-
grated in the task set. It can be assumed that, for example, visual
action-effects, like the yellow or green background for the mag-
nitude task, are incorporated as component to the task-set. This
would imply that action effects within one task should be similar
and easily distinguishable from the action effects of the alterna-
tive task, so that they have a positive effect in task performance
(cf. Honig et al., 1984). However, action effects do not have to
be similar to the respective response, concerning for example an
ideomotor-compatible response-modality/effect-modality map-
ping (Greenwald, 1972), spatial compatibility (Ansorge, 2002; Pfis-
ter et al., 2010), numerical magnitude compatibility (Badets et al.,
2012), verbal response-effect compatibility (Koch and Kunde,
2002), or the compatibility between key-alignment and respec-
tive tone production (Keller and Koch, 2008) in order to become
associated with a task. This conclusion is also corroborated by
studies of Hommel (2009), in which he investigated the influence
of irrelevant action features. He found reliable correspondence
effects for irrelevant action-effects. He concluded that not only
intended, but also non-intended action effects are automatically
integrated in the action code (automatic integration hypothesis).
Although intended action-effects may be weighted more in the
action code (Hommel, 2009; cf. Herwig and Waszak, 2009), hav-
ing more influence on response selection, our results show that also
non-intended, task-irrelevant action effects can show an impor-
tant influence in task performance (cf. also Pfister et al., 2010,
2011).
This association seems to occur very fast, as the switch costs
were already smaller in the first two blocks for the experimen-
tal group compared to the control group, although participants
had only little opportunity to experience the predictable task-
response-effect mapping. There is also evidence in the study of
Kiesel and Hoffmann (2004) that the mental association between
the predictable mappings is built up quickly: after the first half of
the experiment, they interchanged the task context-action effect
assignment. Performance did not differ in the two halves of
the experiment, demonstrating that participants learned the new
assignment very fast, even though the old assignment could have
interfered. If action effects play a role in task implementation – and
our results argue for it – only few encounters with the predictable
mapping might be enough to build up an association (cf. also
Dutzi and Hommel, 2009, who also argue for a fast response-effect
binding).
Taken together, our data support the hypothesis that action
effects play an important role in task implementation. Further,
we can conclude that the learned associations are task-specific,
that means task-response-effect associations instead of stimulus-
response-effect associations, because the switch costs are affected.
In this regard, one might ask if action effects do not only influence
task-set activation but are even a part of the task set as a distinct
task-set component. With respect to our study, this assumption is
not yet necessary, but this may be a theoretical option that should
be investigated in future studies. Either way, one should not forget
that in our daily life, performing tasks has mostly external effects.
Hence, to really understand how humans are dealing with multiple
tasks in their daily life, action effects should be considered as an
important influence in task performance in future studies.
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